Post by Die Fledermaus on Jun 4, 2009 22:56:12 GMT -4
These are comments, reviews, found on Amazon. The book was highly recommended to me by a friend in the Army. The Shattered Sword: The Untold story of the Battle of Midway. I should be aware of it, but have been too busy and distracted with many things. I will comment in the next post below this.
>> Further, the authors claim with convincing evidence that the incessant American attacks throughout the morning kept the Japanese fleet largely on the defensive, as it tried to augment its Combat Air Patrol with additional launchings of fighter aircraft.
. The authors argue that Yamamoto's Midway strategy lost sight of the principles of Mass and Objective
the Japanese lost sight of the principle of the Objective--were they there to defeat the American fleet or invade Midway and the Aleutians, or both?
The Japanese, argue the authors, where overconfident after years of victories over both Asian and Western adversaries, and had contempt for their American foe.
Another contributor to fabricated history was Air Commander Stanhope Ring, whose gross incompetence made the Hornet almost useless in this battle, after the destruction of VT-8, there was plenty of time for the Japanese fighters to regain altitude and their original covering positions before the Enterprise dive bombers arrived, but this simply did not happen, and poor Japanese fighter coordination was to blame. <<
>> I first read about the Battle of Midway a long time ago and decided to revisit this history. "Shattered Sword" has to rank as one of the best ever books that I have read about this conflict.
The book, through careful research of Japanese and American naval records ends up shattering a number of long standing myths (both American and Japanese) about this battle.
(Another book "The Unknown Battle of Midway: The Destruction of the American Torpedo Squadrons" should be read as a companion piece to "Shattered Sword" - it gives an in-depth account of the failings of American naval aviation at the Battle of Midway).
There is a reason that it has taken over sixty years for such a book to be written about this battle. It has taken that long to finally get a dispassionate look at the events as they really happened.
Almost all the major participants who contributed to the original story of the battle are now dead. American pride about her victories in WWII and the need for myth-making about the heroics of the Greatest Generation have faded. The result is a greater emphasis on examination of the written record of naval operations to recreate what happened, rather than relying on the spin put out by the original participants of the time.
Japan has also gone through some major societal changes, and is now finally beginning to re-examine her conduct during WWII. Much of what is new in this book comes from the Japanese record, and the authors were assisted along the way by a number of Japanese historians.
While eyewitness accounts are normally critical for historians, "Shattered Sword" makes clear that, for this battle, certain participants had motives for not telling the truth.
One of the major fabricators of history singled out by this book is Mitsuo Fuchida, the Japanese pilot-author who single-handedly created the myth (with his book "Midway: The Battle that Doomed Japan") that the Japanese carriers were only five minutes away from launching their attack on the American carriers, and that the Enterprise dive bombers came down on carriers fully laden with planes ready to launch (not true - the Japanese carriers were caught totally unprepared with empty decks).
Another contributor to fabricated history was Air Commander Stanhope Ring, whose gross incompetence made the Hornet almost useless in this battle, and contributed to the destruction of Hornet's VT-8 torpedo squadron. The subsequent US Navy cover-up of Ring's failures (he was even awarded a Navy Cross) started the myth that the sacrifice of VT-8 was not in vain, that the result of having the entire torpedo squadron shot down was that the covering Zeros were pulled down to sea level, away from the oncoming Enterprise dive bombers. The authors show how this could not have been the real reason - after the destruction of VT-8, there was plenty of time for the Japanese fighters to regain altitude and their original covering positions before the Enterprise dive bombers arrived, but this simply did not happen, and poor Japanese fighter coordination was to blame.
The best parts of the book are the conclusions at the end. What caused the battle of Midway to play out as it did? What would have happened had the American naval force lost? Parshall and Tully come up with some fascinating insights, which I will summarize and make additional comments upon as follows:
1. Japanese Naval thinking and the entire Japanese war strategy against the US was dominated by the success of their last war against a major power - the Russo-Japan conflict of 1904-1905 (following the axiom that generals always fight their last war again). The Battle of Tsushima was the model for the Decisive Fleet Battle that the Japanese sought (and never could quite win) throughout WWII against the US. (I did some additional reading on this war, and discovered other striking parallels. It was almost frightening how the Japanese Navy, especially Yamamoto, tried to duplicate the success of Admiral Togo from that war - Togo had even started the war with a sneak attack, before war was formally declared, on the Russian Pacific Fleet berthed at Port Arthur in Manchuria. Thus, the strategy behind the Japanese sneak attack on Pearl Harbor becomes crystal clear - previously, Japan had been able to get its way and win favorable terms in a limited war against a much larger power by destroying almost the entire fleet of its opponent, starting with a sneak attack. Japan obviously made a huge miscalculation. Russia was a seriously dysfunctional nation at the time of the Russo-Japan war. America was far from that, and instead, like Rome at Cannae, would be energized by her military disaster to become the world's dominant superpower. Thus the attack on Pearl Harbor expanded into a total war of annihilation). Much of the persistent tendency throughout WWII of Japanese naval commanders to disengage and turn away from their original objectives after the first battle was probably also related to this underlying theme of preserving the ships for the Decisive Fleet Battle.
2. American victory at Midway did not hinge totally on the success of naval code breaking (another myth). Because the naval air forces were so evenly balanced in this battle, success depended ultimately on which fleet could find and attack the other fleet first. At Midway, it was the superior search patterns used by the US, and some lucky guessing by individual aviators, that allowed the US fleet to find and attack the Japanese fleet first. For much of the rest of 1942, the US Navy would not be so lucky.
3. Japanese failure to learn from their mistakes, or to anticipate possible failure was a cultural phenomenon that contributed greatly to their disaster at Midway. I want to add a point here that Parshall and Tully did not come out and say in their book. The name of this cultural phenomenon was bushido, the rigid samurai code of discipline and behavior that dominated Japanese military thinking at the time. Bushido was what allowed Japanese commanders to make suicidal demands of their subordinates, bushido was what prevented lower level underlings from refusing such assignments, bushido meant that the mistaken decisions of one's superiors had to be atoned for with the suicide of the person supposed to carry out the order if he failed, thus shielding that superior for an unnecessarily prolonged period of time until the mistakes and bodies piled up, and bushido was what prevented rapid implementation of ideas coming from underlings, indeed bushido probably discouraged independent, innovative thinking altogether from the lower ranks. I have always regarded the Japanese bushido coda of committing suicide to atone for failure in battle, rather than to survive, learn from the mistake, and continue to fight, as the ultimate in wasteful ceremonial stupidity, something that could only evolve on an isolated island, much like pigmy mammoths and dodo birds.
4. Parshall and Tully conclude that, even if the American carriers had lost the naval battle, a subsequent Japanese land invasion of Midway would have been a bloodbath for the Japanese. As a comparison, they point out the ultimate slaughter of Colonel Ichiki (the man supposed to lead the invasion of Midway) and his men at Guadalcanal. It is likely that had the American carriers been defeated decisively, Midway, not Guadalcanal, would have become the next major bloody ground battle of the Pacific war. (An excellent companion reader here is "Guadalcanal: The Definitive Account of the Landmark Battle" - compared to Midway, the Japanese Navy did a much better tactical job at Guadalcanal, sinking a great many US ships, while continuing to remain befuddled strategically, and so many of Parshall and Tully's conclusions are re-emphasized by the re-analysis of Guadalcanal in this book).
Thus, in conclusion, Midway was not a climactic battle, nor even the turning point of the war. It was only one lucky break for the US Navy in what was a long series of battles of attrition in the Pacific during 1942, a time that both sides would make plenty of mistakes and lose almost equal numbers of men, ships, and aircraft. As Parshall and Tully point out, the real turning points would come in 1943, when the first of the more than 100 new American carriers built during WWII became operational, and when the superior F6F became operational. Japan had nothing that could come close to matching such forces, and the original plans of her warlords to win a limited regional war by way of a sneak attack and a Decisive Fleet Battle, a la the earlier Russo-Japan war, failed completely. By 1944, the US Navy would be operating and attacking at will in the Pacific and fully engaged in finishing out a total war of annihilation. <<
>> Further, the authors claim with convincing evidence that the incessant American attacks throughout the morning kept the Japanese fleet largely on the defensive, as it tried to augment its Combat Air Patrol with additional launchings of fighter aircraft.
. The authors argue that Yamamoto's Midway strategy lost sight of the principles of Mass and Objective
the Japanese lost sight of the principle of the Objective--were they there to defeat the American fleet or invade Midway and the Aleutians, or both?
The Japanese, argue the authors, where overconfident after years of victories over both Asian and Western adversaries, and had contempt for their American foe.
Another contributor to fabricated history was Air Commander Stanhope Ring, whose gross incompetence made the Hornet almost useless in this battle, after the destruction of VT-8, there was plenty of time for the Japanese fighters to regain altitude and their original covering positions before the Enterprise dive bombers arrived, but this simply did not happen, and poor Japanese fighter coordination was to blame. <<
>> I first read about the Battle of Midway a long time ago and decided to revisit this history. "Shattered Sword" has to rank as one of the best ever books that I have read about this conflict.
The book, through careful research of Japanese and American naval records ends up shattering a number of long standing myths (both American and Japanese) about this battle.
(Another book "The Unknown Battle of Midway: The Destruction of the American Torpedo Squadrons" should be read as a companion piece to "Shattered Sword" - it gives an in-depth account of the failings of American naval aviation at the Battle of Midway).
There is a reason that it has taken over sixty years for such a book to be written about this battle. It has taken that long to finally get a dispassionate look at the events as they really happened.
Almost all the major participants who contributed to the original story of the battle are now dead. American pride about her victories in WWII and the need for myth-making about the heroics of the Greatest Generation have faded. The result is a greater emphasis on examination of the written record of naval operations to recreate what happened, rather than relying on the spin put out by the original participants of the time.
Japan has also gone through some major societal changes, and is now finally beginning to re-examine her conduct during WWII. Much of what is new in this book comes from the Japanese record, and the authors were assisted along the way by a number of Japanese historians.
While eyewitness accounts are normally critical for historians, "Shattered Sword" makes clear that, for this battle, certain participants had motives for not telling the truth.
One of the major fabricators of history singled out by this book is Mitsuo Fuchida, the Japanese pilot-author who single-handedly created the myth (with his book "Midway: The Battle that Doomed Japan") that the Japanese carriers were only five minutes away from launching their attack on the American carriers, and that the Enterprise dive bombers came down on carriers fully laden with planes ready to launch (not true - the Japanese carriers were caught totally unprepared with empty decks).
Another contributor to fabricated history was Air Commander Stanhope Ring, whose gross incompetence made the Hornet almost useless in this battle, and contributed to the destruction of Hornet's VT-8 torpedo squadron. The subsequent US Navy cover-up of Ring's failures (he was even awarded a Navy Cross) started the myth that the sacrifice of VT-8 was not in vain, that the result of having the entire torpedo squadron shot down was that the covering Zeros were pulled down to sea level, away from the oncoming Enterprise dive bombers. The authors show how this could not have been the real reason - after the destruction of VT-8, there was plenty of time for the Japanese fighters to regain altitude and their original covering positions before the Enterprise dive bombers arrived, but this simply did not happen, and poor Japanese fighter coordination was to blame.
The best parts of the book are the conclusions at the end. What caused the battle of Midway to play out as it did? What would have happened had the American naval force lost? Parshall and Tully come up with some fascinating insights, which I will summarize and make additional comments upon as follows:
1. Japanese Naval thinking and the entire Japanese war strategy against the US was dominated by the success of their last war against a major power - the Russo-Japan conflict of 1904-1905 (following the axiom that generals always fight their last war again). The Battle of Tsushima was the model for the Decisive Fleet Battle that the Japanese sought (and never could quite win) throughout WWII against the US. (I did some additional reading on this war, and discovered other striking parallels. It was almost frightening how the Japanese Navy, especially Yamamoto, tried to duplicate the success of Admiral Togo from that war - Togo had even started the war with a sneak attack, before war was formally declared, on the Russian Pacific Fleet berthed at Port Arthur in Manchuria. Thus, the strategy behind the Japanese sneak attack on Pearl Harbor becomes crystal clear - previously, Japan had been able to get its way and win favorable terms in a limited war against a much larger power by destroying almost the entire fleet of its opponent, starting with a sneak attack. Japan obviously made a huge miscalculation. Russia was a seriously dysfunctional nation at the time of the Russo-Japan war. America was far from that, and instead, like Rome at Cannae, would be energized by her military disaster to become the world's dominant superpower. Thus the attack on Pearl Harbor expanded into a total war of annihilation). Much of the persistent tendency throughout WWII of Japanese naval commanders to disengage and turn away from their original objectives after the first battle was probably also related to this underlying theme of preserving the ships for the Decisive Fleet Battle.
2. American victory at Midway did not hinge totally on the success of naval code breaking (another myth). Because the naval air forces were so evenly balanced in this battle, success depended ultimately on which fleet could find and attack the other fleet first. At Midway, it was the superior search patterns used by the US, and some lucky guessing by individual aviators, that allowed the US fleet to find and attack the Japanese fleet first. For much of the rest of 1942, the US Navy would not be so lucky.
3. Japanese failure to learn from their mistakes, or to anticipate possible failure was a cultural phenomenon that contributed greatly to their disaster at Midway. I want to add a point here that Parshall and Tully did not come out and say in their book. The name of this cultural phenomenon was bushido, the rigid samurai code of discipline and behavior that dominated Japanese military thinking at the time. Bushido was what allowed Japanese commanders to make suicidal demands of their subordinates, bushido was what prevented lower level underlings from refusing such assignments, bushido meant that the mistaken decisions of one's superiors had to be atoned for with the suicide of the person supposed to carry out the order if he failed, thus shielding that superior for an unnecessarily prolonged period of time until the mistakes and bodies piled up, and bushido was what prevented rapid implementation of ideas coming from underlings, indeed bushido probably discouraged independent, innovative thinking altogether from the lower ranks. I have always regarded the Japanese bushido coda of committing suicide to atone for failure in battle, rather than to survive, learn from the mistake, and continue to fight, as the ultimate in wasteful ceremonial stupidity, something that could only evolve on an isolated island, much like pigmy mammoths and dodo birds.
4. Parshall and Tully conclude that, even if the American carriers had lost the naval battle, a subsequent Japanese land invasion of Midway would have been a bloodbath for the Japanese. As a comparison, they point out the ultimate slaughter of Colonel Ichiki (the man supposed to lead the invasion of Midway) and his men at Guadalcanal. It is likely that had the American carriers been defeated decisively, Midway, not Guadalcanal, would have become the next major bloody ground battle of the Pacific war. (An excellent companion reader here is "Guadalcanal: The Definitive Account of the Landmark Battle" - compared to Midway, the Japanese Navy did a much better tactical job at Guadalcanal, sinking a great many US ships, while continuing to remain befuddled strategically, and so many of Parshall and Tully's conclusions are re-emphasized by the re-analysis of Guadalcanal in this book).
Thus, in conclusion, Midway was not a climactic battle, nor even the turning point of the war. It was only one lucky break for the US Navy in what was a long series of battles of attrition in the Pacific during 1942, a time that both sides would make plenty of mistakes and lose almost equal numbers of men, ships, and aircraft. As Parshall and Tully point out, the real turning points would come in 1943, when the first of the more than 100 new American carriers built during WWII became operational, and when the superior F6F became operational. Japan had nothing that could come close to matching such forces, and the original plans of her warlords to win a limited regional war by way of a sneak attack and a Decisive Fleet Battle, a la the earlier Russo-Japan war, failed completely. By 1944, the US Navy would be operating and attacking at will in the Pacific and fully engaged in finishing out a total war of annihilation. <<