Post by Die Fledermaus on Oct 15, 2008 22:14:05 GMT -4
Two frigates and one corvette was the entire Danish navy there at Heligoland? The Austrian force was small, also.
>> The frigate Jylland is today located in a drydock in a maritime museum in Ebeltoft, Denmark. <<
Very interesting! Can you name the warships still in existence built after 1864 and pre-Dreadnought?
About the first battle of Heligoland, this was of interest:
>> It was not only the first excursion of the small fleet under the black-red-gold Flag of Germany, but remained the only one. <<
I thought that was the Weimar flag, and the actual flag of Imperial Germany had white instead of gold.
>> If the attack came in winter, when they were frozen, then Dannevirke could easily be outflanked - and lo and behold, the German states attacked in winter. <<
Were Winters colder in those days? It seems a stretch to assume deep frozen lakes. Or did they wait before declaring war until the weather was cold enough long enough?
Great image:
en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Image:Tropper_1849.jpg
I wish my deceased friend saw that - he'd try to buy it! And he had money.
www.haslev-gym.dk/2xhistorie/Rosenstand-%208%20Brigades%20modst%F8d%20ved%20Dybb%F8l%2018%20april%201865.jpg
The above makes me want to yell out "Merde!".
That is at Dybbøl, I assume. What unit?
>> Every year on April 18, a national memorial is held in Dybbøl. Danish soldiers appear in period uniforms. <<
>> Dybbøl Mill still stands, but the German victory monument was blown up in 1945. The perpetrators were never identified, and this monument has never been rebuilt. <<
It was built on Danish territory??
Were the Danes at Dybbøl relying on naval ships for retreat, what with so much water behind them?
What was Sweden's role in the First Schleswig War? I mean military.
Anyway, very interesting stuff. I am no expert on this period, so I am not qualified to give you a grade. Grade yourself!
Thanks again.
- - - - - - - - - -
>>
The primary reasons were political rather than military. The Danish public at the time was imbued with nationalistic jingoism as a result of the events of 1848-51. Schleswig and Holstein were not really a part of Denmark, but independent duchies with the Danish king as their duke. With the collapse of the absolute monarchy in 1848 and the introduction of a democratic constitution, the duchies became a problem. Danish nationalists wanted to make Schleswig, where the population was part Danish, a fully integrated part of the Danish national state (Holstein, being German through and through, were seen as a lost cause by all but the most fanatical). The German population in the duchies revolted against this development - if they were not independent under the Danish crown (or independent dukes), they would rather be part of the German state that many people dreamt of at this time. It lead to a war between Denmark and several members of the German League 1848-51, which ended in what was perceived as a Danish victory, even though it had more to do with the diplomatic intervention of the great powers (Russia and Britain in particular) on behalf of Denmark. But the great powers really just wanted to preserve the status quo, that is keep the duchies as independent crown-lands of the Danish king. So the Danish nationalist were left with the impression that they had won militarily but been 'cheated' at the negotiations. It also meant that the problem was not solved and kept on being a bone of contention between Denmark and the German states.
The 'Spirit of 1848' meant that the Danish nationalists kept pushing for a new constitution, that acknowledged Schleswig as a part of Denmark, and it also left them with the certainty, that we could beat the Germans again if it came to that. More reasonable heads in the Danish government could see, that this was a perilous idea, since the German League, under Prussian influence, was becoming stronger and the support of the great powers were slipping away from Denmark. But even though they could see that, they didn't have the moral courage to stand up to the mood of the public out of fear of being deposed (along with the king) or maybe even triggering outright revolution. So the nationalists were increasingly able to dominate the agenda and steer Denmark on a course that left us in an impossible situation without friends. In 1863 the new constitution was written, and it served as an immediate casus belli for the German states.
So why did Denmark think it could hold its own? On a political level it was the result of wishful thinking and make-belief coupled with moral cowardice by those who knew better.
On a military level, Denmark had some cause to believe that Danish sea power would once more serve us well. The Prussians and other northern German states had no navy of any significance, so even though the Danish navy was a shadow of its former self, it could still keep the Germans from attempting any sea borne invasions. The only viable threat was from the Austrian navy, but it wasn't possible for them to send a large force all the way to the North Sea and leave themselves exposed against enemies nearer at home in the Mediterranean. In the event, they only sent a small squadron during the war, and it was defeated at the Battle of Heligoland - the only real Danish success of the war.
This left a land-invasion as the only threat, and that meant that the war would be fought in the duchies themselves and possibly in Jutland. No-one had any intention of trying to defend Holstein, but most of Schleswig would be protected by the defensive lines at Dannevirke. The Danish nationalist had great faith in Dannevirke (partly a result of the mythology of the place - Dannevirke had been the bulwark of Denmark since the Viking-era), and this was compounded by the commanding general on the spot, de Meza, making bombastic public statements about being able to defeat forces 3 to 4 times as large as his own if they attacked Dannevirke. In reality neither the army high command or de Meza truly believed this, but to the nationalists it meant that Denmark was impregnable against German attack. However Dannevirke only cover about a third of the distance from coast to coast on the peninsula, the remaining two thirds being protected by water-obstacles. These were seen as impassable, but only during a summer campaign. If the attack came in winter, when they were frozen, then Dannevirke could easily be outflanked - and lo and behold, the German states attacked in winter.
So, when the enemy was at the gates in January-February 1864, de Meza and his commanders didn't believe they could hold, and in accordance with his instructions from the high command about keeping the army intact until a battle could be fought in the spring or summer, he decided to evacuate Dannevirke without a fight and retreat north. In stead he and the army intended to occupy secure flanking positions at Dybbøl and Fredericia, which could be kept supplied and reinforced by the navy, making it risky for the Germans to penetrate too far north. The abandonment of Dannevirke was a huge psychological blow to the Danish nationalist and the public in general - probably the worst blow of the entire war - and de Meza was made the scapegoat. Negotiations started in London soon after, but the fighting continued since both sides hoped to strengthen their hand in the negotiations by a military success. The Germans wanted to occupy all of Schleswig and thus present its loss as a fait accompli in London. The Danes wanted to prevent that in order to keep alive the ambition of holding on to Schleswig.
This meant that the battle of Dybbøl, nothing more than a minor flanking position in Schleswig, became the centre of attention in the war - the place where the war would be decided. The weight of German numbers and modern arms soon began to tell but Dybbøl was maintained even after it had lost military significance. It grew from a small bargaining chip to the psychological centre of the conflict and finally, when all hope was lost, to the scene of a 'heroic' last stand to bring glory and honour to Denmark. The result was inevitable and catastrophic for Denmark. At the same time, we pissed away even the chance of any small concessions the Germans might have been willing to make in London. So in the end, all of Schleswig, even the parts that were predominantly Danish, had to be handed over.
That is true. As it became clear that the great powers would not support what they saw as Danish recalcitrance, the Danish government put great stock in the possibility of military help from the Union of Sweden-Norway. 'Scandinavism' had been a huge issue before the war, with proposals of making a union of all the Northern states - but it was never going to happen. It was just the wide-eyed flights of fancy of idealists in both countries ('Scandinaïvity' it's been called) and ran counter to any realpolitik-interests of the countries involved. The Danish government may have hoped for Swedish support and may even have had encouraging promises from the Swedish king and members of government, but they were clutching at straws. Another part of the unreal air that surrounded the Danish decision to seek confrontation.
<<
>> The frigate Jylland is today located in a drydock in a maritime museum in Ebeltoft, Denmark. <<
Very interesting! Can you name the warships still in existence built after 1864 and pre-Dreadnought?
About the first battle of Heligoland, this was of interest:
>> It was not only the first excursion of the small fleet under the black-red-gold Flag of Germany, but remained the only one. <<
I thought that was the Weimar flag, and the actual flag of Imperial Germany had white instead of gold.
>> If the attack came in winter, when they were frozen, then Dannevirke could easily be outflanked - and lo and behold, the German states attacked in winter. <<
Were Winters colder in those days? It seems a stretch to assume deep frozen lakes. Or did they wait before declaring war until the weather was cold enough long enough?
Great image:
en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Image:Tropper_1849.jpg
I wish my deceased friend saw that - he'd try to buy it! And he had money.
www.haslev-gym.dk/2xhistorie/Rosenstand-%208%20Brigades%20modst%F8d%20ved%20Dybb%F8l%2018%20april%201865.jpg
The above makes me want to yell out "Merde!".
That is at Dybbøl, I assume. What unit? >> Every year on April 18, a national memorial is held in Dybbøl. Danish soldiers appear in period uniforms. <<
>> Dybbøl Mill still stands, but the German victory monument was blown up in 1945. The perpetrators were never identified, and this monument has never been rebuilt. <<
It was built on Danish territory??Were the Danes at Dybbøl relying on naval ships for retreat, what with so much water behind them?
What was Sweden's role in the First Schleswig War? I mean military.
Anyway, very interesting stuff. I am no expert on this period, so I am not qualified to give you a grade. Grade yourself!
Thanks again.
- - - - - - - - - -
>>
The primary reasons were political rather than military. The Danish public at the time was imbued with nationalistic jingoism as a result of the events of 1848-51. Schleswig and Holstein were not really a part of Denmark, but independent duchies with the Danish king as their duke. With the collapse of the absolute monarchy in 1848 and the introduction of a democratic constitution, the duchies became a problem. Danish nationalists wanted to make Schleswig, where the population was part Danish, a fully integrated part of the Danish national state (Holstein, being German through and through, were seen as a lost cause by all but the most fanatical). The German population in the duchies revolted against this development - if they were not independent under the Danish crown (or independent dukes), they would rather be part of the German state that many people dreamt of at this time. It lead to a war between Denmark and several members of the German League 1848-51, which ended in what was perceived as a Danish victory, even though it had more to do with the diplomatic intervention of the great powers (Russia and Britain in particular) on behalf of Denmark. But the great powers really just wanted to preserve the status quo, that is keep the duchies as independent crown-lands of the Danish king. So the Danish nationalist were left with the impression that they had won militarily but been 'cheated' at the negotiations. It also meant that the problem was not solved and kept on being a bone of contention between Denmark and the German states.
The 'Spirit of 1848' meant that the Danish nationalists kept pushing for a new constitution, that acknowledged Schleswig as a part of Denmark, and it also left them with the certainty, that we could beat the Germans again if it came to that. More reasonable heads in the Danish government could see, that this was a perilous idea, since the German League, under Prussian influence, was becoming stronger and the support of the great powers were slipping away from Denmark. But even though they could see that, they didn't have the moral courage to stand up to the mood of the public out of fear of being deposed (along with the king) or maybe even triggering outright revolution. So the nationalists were increasingly able to dominate the agenda and steer Denmark on a course that left us in an impossible situation without friends. In 1863 the new constitution was written, and it served as an immediate casus belli for the German states.
So why did Denmark think it could hold its own? On a political level it was the result of wishful thinking and make-belief coupled with moral cowardice by those who knew better.
On a military level, Denmark had some cause to believe that Danish sea power would once more serve us well. The Prussians and other northern German states had no navy of any significance, so even though the Danish navy was a shadow of its former self, it could still keep the Germans from attempting any sea borne invasions. The only viable threat was from the Austrian navy, but it wasn't possible for them to send a large force all the way to the North Sea and leave themselves exposed against enemies nearer at home in the Mediterranean. In the event, they only sent a small squadron during the war, and it was defeated at the Battle of Heligoland - the only real Danish success of the war.
This left a land-invasion as the only threat, and that meant that the war would be fought in the duchies themselves and possibly in Jutland. No-one had any intention of trying to defend Holstein, but most of Schleswig would be protected by the defensive lines at Dannevirke. The Danish nationalist had great faith in Dannevirke (partly a result of the mythology of the place - Dannevirke had been the bulwark of Denmark since the Viking-era), and this was compounded by the commanding general on the spot, de Meza, making bombastic public statements about being able to defeat forces 3 to 4 times as large as his own if they attacked Dannevirke. In reality neither the army high command or de Meza truly believed this, but to the nationalists it meant that Denmark was impregnable against German attack. However Dannevirke only cover about a third of the distance from coast to coast on the peninsula, the remaining two thirds being protected by water-obstacles. These were seen as impassable, but only during a summer campaign. If the attack came in winter, when they were frozen, then Dannevirke could easily be outflanked - and lo and behold, the German states attacked in winter.
So, when the enemy was at the gates in January-February 1864, de Meza and his commanders didn't believe they could hold, and in accordance with his instructions from the high command about keeping the army intact until a battle could be fought in the spring or summer, he decided to evacuate Dannevirke without a fight and retreat north. In stead he and the army intended to occupy secure flanking positions at Dybbøl and Fredericia, which could be kept supplied and reinforced by the navy, making it risky for the Germans to penetrate too far north. The abandonment of Dannevirke was a huge psychological blow to the Danish nationalist and the public in general - probably the worst blow of the entire war - and de Meza was made the scapegoat. Negotiations started in London soon after, but the fighting continued since both sides hoped to strengthen their hand in the negotiations by a military success. The Germans wanted to occupy all of Schleswig and thus present its loss as a fait accompli in London. The Danes wanted to prevent that in order to keep alive the ambition of holding on to Schleswig.
This meant that the battle of Dybbøl, nothing more than a minor flanking position in Schleswig, became the centre of attention in the war - the place where the war would be decided. The weight of German numbers and modern arms soon began to tell but Dybbøl was maintained even after it had lost military significance. It grew from a small bargaining chip to the psychological centre of the conflict and finally, when all hope was lost, to the scene of a 'heroic' last stand to bring glory and honour to Denmark. The result was inevitable and catastrophic for Denmark. At the same time, we pissed away even the chance of any small concessions the Germans might have been willing to make in London. So in the end, all of Schleswig, even the parts that were predominantly Danish, had to be handed over.
That is true. As it became clear that the great powers would not support what they saw as Danish recalcitrance, the Danish government put great stock in the possibility of military help from the Union of Sweden-Norway. 'Scandinavism' had been a huge issue before the war, with proposals of making a union of all the Northern states - but it was never going to happen. It was just the wide-eyed flights of fancy of idealists in both countries ('Scandinaïvity' it's been called) and ran counter to any realpolitik-interests of the countries involved. The Danish government may have hoped for Swedish support and may even have had encouraging promises from the Swedish king and members of government, but they were clutching at straws. Another part of the unreal air that surrounded the Danish decision to seek confrontation.
<<
